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Abstract
We present the “¿xed exchange rate” version of the Obstfeld and Rogoff model and
analyze the international transmission of ¿scal policy shocks. It is shown that the welfare
effects of an unanticipated contraction in government expenditure in the home country
crucially depend on the way in which world money stock is set. If home authorities alone
are responsible for pegging the exchange rate, a ¿scal adjustment induces a decrease in the
real interest rate, stimulates private consumption and limits the contraction in world output,
compared with a situation in which a cooperative scheme is implemented. The model is then
used to propose a new interpretation of recent events in the EU countries that have enacted
restrictive ¿scal policies while pegging their currencies to the DM.
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 Banca d’Italia, Research Department.1. Introduction
1
Although manyresearchershavesought sincethe early eighties to develop dynamicopen
economy models with explicit microfoundations,
2 the Mundell-Fleming model has remained
the most widely used framework for analyzing the international transmission of monetary
and ¿scal policy. This is because until very recently microfounded international models were
unable, by assuming fully Àexible prices, to predict certain standard features of the short-run
dynamics of output, exchange rates and the current account induced by changes in policy
variables.
ThemodelproposedbyObstfeldand Rogoff(1995a, 1996)introducesshort-runnominal
price rigidities in a setup based on the intertemporal approach to the current account with
monopolistic competition on the supply side. This resolves the previous shortcomings but to
date has been used essentially to study the responses to money supply shocks in a context of
Àexible exchange rates.
3
In this paper we solve the Obstfeld-Rogoff model (O-R) under ¿xed exchange rates
and analyze the international transmission of ¿scal policy shocks, with particular reference to
the experience of the EU countries over the past two decades. There are at least three good
reasons for this analytical exercise. First, since the O-R model is certain to be increasingly
used, even outside the academic world, it seems natural to provide a “¿xed exchange rate”
version, whose properties can then be compared with those of the Mundell-Fleming model.
The second reason is more speci¿c. So far, the literature on ¿scal consolidation in Europe has
not satisfactorily addressed the issue of international transmission under ¿xed exchange rates.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) focused essentially on the effects on private consumption,
4 A draft of this paper was written while I was visiting Princeton University. I wish to thank Filippo Al-
tissimo, Riccardo De Bonis, Annalisa Ferrando, Roberto Rinaldi, Alan Sutherland and participants at the Royal
Economic Society Conference, University of Warwick, Coventry, 1-4 April 1998, for very useful comments. My
special thanks go to Tonino Covelli for editorial assistance. I am indebted to Ken Rogoff to whom I owe a great
deal for encouragement and intellectual stimulation. All errors and omissions are of course mine. The views
expressed are my own and do not necessarily reÀect those of the Banca d’Italia.
5 This literature is usually referred to as the intertemporal approach to the current account and to the inter-
national real business cycle. For surveys of these works, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995b) and Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1993).
6 See, for example, Betts and Devereux (1996) and Kollmann (1997). Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997)
have developed an international real business cycle model with sticky prices and price discrimination across
markets to study the effects on nominal and real exchange rates of a shock to money growth.8
referring to the closed economy version of the overlapping-generations model proposed by
Blanchard (1985),
4 while the open economy model proposed by Alesina and Perotti (1997),
though correctly emphasizing the role of redistributive budgetary policies and of distortionary
taxation in Europe, is highly unsatisfactory on a number of grounds, mainly because, as a
static model, it simply ignores the implications of intertemporal government and consumer
constraints. Third, by deriving economic agents’ behavior from utility maximization, the O-
R model offers a radically new perspective to evaluate the welfare effects of the choice of
alternative exchange rate and monetary policy regimes. The consequences are quite surprising
and suggest a profound reconsideration of ¿scal consolidation in the EU countries. The paper
shows, in fact, that if one country (say France) enacts an unanticipated permanent reduction
in government consumption, a bilateral exchange rate peg would not be welfare-improving
with respect to a situation in which the foreign country (say Germany) pursues an independent
monetary policy, while France unilaterally pegs its exchange rate to the Deutsche Mark.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief non-technical description of
the O-R model with ¿xed exchange rates (the formal model is described in detail in Appendix
I) and draws the main implications regarding both permanent and temporary ¿scal shocks.
Section 3 provides some broad empirical evidence on the timing of ¿scal actions in EU
countries in the last two decades and their macroeconomic impact and presents the results
of an empirical test focused on the responses of private consumption to changes in public
consumption. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Obstfeld-Rogoff model with ¿xed exchange rates
The model postulates two countries inhabited by in¿nitively lived consumer-producers
with perfect foresight who share the same preferences and technology and maximize their
utility over consumption, real money balances and leisure. Each producer has some
monopolistic power over his single differentiated good, which is sold in both countries at
the same price, expressed in a common currency.
7 The open economy version of this model is not particularly useful for studying the international transmis-
sion of ¿scal policy since it assumes fully Àexible prices, exogenous output and an exogenous real interest rate.
The same criticism applies to Bertola and Drazen (1993) and to Sutherland (1995).9
Homecountry(H)andforeigncountry(F)areidenticalexceptforsizeandthegoodsthey
produce. Though the relative price of the consumption bundle is always equal to one because
of identical tastes and no barriers to trade, the relative price of H’s goods with respect to F (the
terms of trade) can vary in response to exogenous shocks. The demand for any good depends
on its price relative to that of the consumption bundle and on total world demand (private and
public consumption
5). The supply function states that the marginal utility of the additional
revenue obtained from an extra unit of a given good must equal the marginal disutility of the
leisure foregone.
6
The only asset traded in the perfectly integrated world capital market is a riskless bond
earning interest expressed in terms of the consumption bundle. Real money balances can be
held only by domestic residents demand for them depends on private consumption and on the
nominal interest rate, which is the same in the two countries and is equal to the real interest
rate plus expected inÀation.
It is assumed that government consumption is purely dissipative and does not affect
productivity or private utility and that it is ¿nanced by non-distortionary taxes and seignorage.
Since Ricardian equivalence holds in the model there is no role for public debt.
7 Given these
circumstances and perfectly Àexible prices, an unanticipated permanent ¿scal contraction in H
would cause the system to display typical classical properties and instantaneously jump to the
new steady-state equilibrium, with no effects on the current account or real interest rate. In
particular, steady-state consumption in H would increase by less than the amount of the ¿scal
cut, because residents discount a higher level of permanent income and work less therefore
H’s output would decline. The opposite would hold for F.
In the O-R model, however, prices are set one period in advance, so that they cannot
adjust immediately to an unanticipated shock thus in the short run (period 1) output is entirely
8 It is assumed that there is no national bias in government demand.
9 Though the level of output is endogenous, it is worth stressing that there is no capital or investment, so
that the model is best applied to short-medium term dynamics.
: An obvious extension would be to develop an overlapping generations version of the model and analyze
how different government expenditure ¿nancing schemes affect the main international transmission channels.
Here, however, our main interest is to focus on the welfare implications of alternative monetary policy regimes
in a context of ¿xed exchange rates.10
demand-determined prices adjust only in the long run (period 2).
8 In this context a permanent
cutinpublicconsumptioninHtiltsthetimepro¿leofoutputavailableforprivateconsumption,
leadingtoacurrentaccountimbalance. Anothersigni¿cantdifferenceincomparisonwithfully
Àexible-price models is that the real interest rate has to change in the short run to maintain
money market equilibrium, thus inducing private consumption to deviate from its new steady-
state level.
Suppose now that H represents any of the EU countries except Germany and F represents
Germany. With Àexible exchange rates this distinction is irrelevant, but it can be crucial
under ¿xed exchange rates, depending on the monetary rules. Since the focus here is on the
transmission of ¿scal shocks in the short and medium run, it is assumed that the exchange rate
parities are perÀectly credible so that no problems from speculative attacks can arise.
We consider two monetary policy regimes. In one, H alone is responsible for pegging
the exchange rate while F pursues an independent monetary policy aimed at long-run price
stability. Thisregimerepresents, admittedlyinrathercrudefashion, thesituationactuallyfaced
by most of the EU countries that have enacted ¿scal adjustment in the last ¿fteen years while
Germany was pursuing price stability.
9 In the other regime, H and F cooperate to maintain the
pegged exchange rate while keeping the world money stock constant.
10
The long run effects of an unanticipated permanent cut in H’s government expenditure
11
on world real variables (consumption, h `, output, h t `, and real money balances, i `  h )
12
are computed equating aggregate world demand and supply of goods and supply and demand
; Kollmann (1997) uses the small-country version of the O-R model to explore its dynamic implications
when prices are set two or four periods in advance and are changed according to a “Calvo-type” mechanism.
< In the period under consideration, Germany severely cut its public consumption only once, in 1989 (see
Table 3 in Section 3).
43 The assumption of constant money stock, rather than a constant rate of growth, is made because the O-R
model is linearized around a steady-state with constant exogenous variables (see Appendix I). Moreover, this
facilitates comparison with the Àexible exchange rate results.
44 In Appendix I the model is solved for the general case in which both H and F change their level of public
consumption.
45 All variables are expressed in per capita terms.11
















where all the variables are expressed as percentage deviations from the initial steady-state
values, ? is H’s share of world population,
13 0 is the inverse of money demand elasticity, and
H’s public consumption, h C, is negative. Long run world consumption and real money balances
increase after a permanent ¿scal contraction in H while world output decreases. Under the
¿rst monetary scheme (h  'f ), the world money stock has to accomodate the higher money
demand inducedby theincrease in consumption forthesame reason, underthe secondscheme
(i ` 'f ) prices must fall (all the results are summarized in Table 1).
As regards individual country variables, while private consumption in H rises (residents
are wealthier, thanks to the cut in future taxes
14), F’s consumption declines because foreign
producers suffer a downward shift in the aggregate demand for their goods. Thanks to higher
permanent income, H-country residents will work less, so output will fall the contrary is true
for F-country residents. Thus, in the new steady state, the relative supply of H’s goods is lower,
producing an improvement in its terms of trade.
The main result is that long-run effects are entirely determined by the real economy and
are thus totally independent of the monetary scheme used to peg the exchange rate .
In the short run, because prices are sticky, the transmission mechanism is radically
different. Since relative prices do not change, the cut in H’s public consumption has the
same impact on aggregate demand and output in both countries.
15 H’s relative consumption
46 When H is very small (q $ 3) world variables are obviously unaffected by the shock.
47 H-country residents’ consumption will increase by less than the fall in public consumption because they
will enjoy more leisure. As we will see below, H residents are better off also because in the short run they
accumulate foreign assets and in the long run will earn interest on them.
48 This result depends crucially on the assumption that there is no national bias in government expenditure.12
increases, but by less than the change in public consumption,
16 so that H runs a current account
surplus (see equation 43A in Appendix I).
17
The impacts on world consumption, e `, and output, e t `,a r eg i v e nb y
18:
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where e o represents the short-run deviation of the the real interest rate from its steady-state
value. This represents the difference between the two monetary schemes. In the ¿rst case, F
aims at stabilizing the long-run price level,
19 so that in the short run the money stock is held
constant (f W 'f ) therefore o must decrease to compensate for the fall in consumption. At
the same time the rise in consumption in H drives the demand for money up with prices ¿xed,
money supply has to rise to prevent an appreciation of the currency.
This result contrasts with that obtained under Àexible exchange rates. In that case, if
world money stock is held constant, the increase in world consumption implies a higher real
interest rate. Here, instead, world money stock has to rise, so the real interest rate falls.
20 Thus
world private consumption is pushed above its new steady-state level and residents in both H
and F enjoy greater consumption at the same time the fall in output is less than in the long run
(Figure 1).
21
49 The change in relative consumption is the same in the short and in the long run (equation 41A).
4: This result contrasts with that obtained under Àexible exchange rates where a permanent ¿scal contraction
in H induces a current account de¿cit (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995a). There the contractionary effects on H’s
relative output are larger since the exchange rate rises and residents need to borrow abroad to smooth their
consumption.
4; Since the ¿scal shock is permanent e J @ h J.
4< Because PPP holds in the model, F acts as a price stabilizer for the whole area.
53 This result does not depend on the assumption of long run price stability and would also hold if monetary
policy in F remained passive even in the long run.
54 Figures 1 and 2 have been drawn with the following parametrization: h J @ e J @ 3=34 u @3 = 37>q@
4@5>@4 3 >%@4 , where u is the steady state value of the real interest rate.13
Let us now consider the second scheme, in which the countries cooperate to peg the
exchange rate and to keep world money stock constant.
22 In this case the real interest rate
is set on the world money market and, since world consumption increases, o must rise the
change is actually the same as with Àexible exchange rates (see Appendix II and Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 1995a).
It is clear from (4) and (5) that in the short run both world consumption and output will
be lower than in the new steady state correspondingly, residents in both H and F enjoy less
consumption and hold lower real money balances, but work less than with a non-cooperative
scheme. Sincethenegativeimpactonconsumptionoutweighsthatonleisure, welfareisgreater
in both countries under the ¿rst than under the second monetary regime (see Appendix II).
A similar analysis can be drawn with respect to a temporary cut in public consumption
in H. The main difference is that long-run real variables for the world do not change however,
the shock does have lasting effects on the single country variables. In particular, in the long
run, there will be a redistribution of consumption and leisure from F to H, H’s terms of trade
will still improve and its residents will accumulate foreign assets (see Table 2 all the technical
details are in Appendix I).
Again, the short run effects depend on which monetary rule is applied. Under the ¿rst,
the real interest rate still declines, pushing consumption in H and F above its long run level
(Figure 2), and output falls in both countries under the second, which is again similar to the
Àexible exchange rate case, no change in the real interest rate is required since long-run world
consumption is unaffected by the temporary shock, and consumption in both countries will
immediately jump to the new long-run equilibrium level.
23 At the same time, output in both H
and F declines more than in the previous case and by the same percentage as H’s government
expenditure. The effects on consumption outweigh those on output, so the ¿rst monetary
scheme results in a higher level of welfare for both countries (Appendix II).
Thus, in the O-R model with ¿xed exchange rates the international transmission of
¿scal schocks is qualitatively the same in the case of permanent or transitory policy changes.
However, from Figures 1 and 2 it is clear that the effects differ greatly in absolute size. In
55 Again, the results would not change qualitatively if the two countries cooperate to maintain long-run price
stability.
56 The temporary fall in world aggregate demand is fully offset by a decrease in output.14
particular, in the case of a permanent shock the choice of the monetary scheme matters a lot,
since the upward or downward adjustment in the real interest rate is signi¿cant. If the ¿scal
shock is temporary, however, the short-run depressive effects on output are large and greater
than the expansionary effect on private consumption.
24
3. Fiscal contractions and expansions in the European Union
In the last two decades severe efforts have been made in most European countries to curb
the rise in the public debt, whose ratio to GDP had considerably increased during the seventies,
after the ¿rst oil shock. Moreover, in the last few years the issue of ¿scal consolidation has
become particularly “hot”, as several EU countries have had to enact signi¿cant budget cuts to
reach the Maastricht target ratio of 3 per cent of GDP by 1997.
Table 3 reports the episodes of “severe” ¿scal expansion or contraction in the period
1979-1997 in the EU countries that joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS at its
launch in 1979
25 and in those that pegged their currencies to the DM (Austria
26)o rt ot h e
ECU (Finland and Sweden
27). The episodes have been selected on the basis of changes in the
share of public consumption in GDP (at constant 1990 prices), using a methodology similar to
that proposed by Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996).
28 A total of 28 severe ¿scal actions were
identi¿ed, 8 expansions and 20 contractions 5 of the expansions were enacted in connection
57 This last result is consistent with the predictions of the models proposed by Bertola and Drazen (1993)
and Sutherland (1995).
58 The United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and Greece are therefore excluded. Luxembourg is also excluded
for lack of data.
59 Austria joined the EU and the ERM only in January 1995 since 1974, however, its exchange rate has been
closely pegged to the DM.
5: Finland and Sweden formally adhered to the EU only in 1995. From 1977 to 1991 the Finnish markka
was actually pegged to a trade-weighted currency index and from 1991 to 1992 to the ECU. From the beginning
of the eighties the Swedish krona was also pegged to a weighted currency basket and from 1991 to the ECU.
5; A severe expansion or contraction is de¿ned when an absolute change in the ratio of public consumption to
GDP, adjusted by the share of public consumption in total primary cyclically adjusted expenditure, is: a) greater
than 1.5 percentage points in a year b) greater than 0.5 percentage points, in each of three consecutive years.
Similar methodologies are also used also by McDermott and Wescott (1996) and by Caselli and Rinaldi (1998).
Changes in public consumption rather than in the cyclically adjusted primary de¿cit are considered here to be
consistent with the O-R model. European Commission data have been used (European Commission, 1997, 1998).15
withthesecondoilshockatthebeginningoftheeighties 7ofthecontractionswereundertaken
in the period 1994-97.
To get a broad idea of the macroeconomic impact, averages of all the variables relevant
to the O-R model were computed for the period of the ¿scal actions and for the two years
before and after each. The data in Tables 4a and 4b are averages of all the episodes reported in
Table 3
29 they must be interpreted with some caution, as their variance is fairly high.
During ¿scal contractions (Table 4a), private consumption growth was higher than in
t h eE Ua saw h o l e
30 and the current account with the rest of the world and the EU, which
started from near balance, turned into a signi¿cant surplus these features persisted in the
following two years and are in line with the model. Also, GDP growth was higher than in the
EU (both during and after ¿scal contractions), in contrast with the model’s predictions of a
zero differential in the short run and a negative differential in the long run.
31 As regards the
terms of trade, the real exchange rate was used as a proxy this seems more appropriate here
since the terms of trade for EU countries were heavily affected by Àuctuations in the prices of
raw materials and the dollar. Two different measures were considered based, respectively, on
unit labor costs and producer prices of manufactures. Although the latter is more consistent
with the model setup, it could be inÀuenced by cyclical variations in pro¿t margins and by
pricing-to-market policies. With ¿xed exchange rates, the real exchange rate should remain
constant in the short run and appreciate in the long run. The data show that, on average, ¿scal
contractions induced a decline in the real exchange rate, in both the short and long run, which
was more pronounced for unit labour costs.
As pointed out in Section 2, the behavior of the real interest rate depends on monetary
rules. In this respect it is reasonable to assume that Germany always followed an independent
monetary policy while all the other EU countries pegged their exchange rates to the DM. A
5< In computing the averages we excluded the last ¿scal contractions in Italy and in Sweden as well as the
Finnish contraction in 1993-95, since they took place, at least partially, with Àexible exchange rates. The Finnish
contraction of 1997 has been included since the Finnish markka joined the ERM in October 1996. The averages
thus refer to 17 rather than 20 episodes.
63 Since the EU includes the country taking the ¿scal measure, the ¿gures underestimate the true differential.
A better measure in this context would be the differential with respect to a weighted average of all the EU
countries not taking any ¿scal action.
64 These results are also in contrast with the standard Mundell-Fleming predictions, which imply that with
¿xed exchange rates in the short run the improvement in the current account comes from a relative decline in
domestic output and consumption.16
decrease (increase) in the real EU interest rate is therefore to be expected as a consequence
of ¿scal contractions (expansions) in all countries except Germany the opposite would stem
from ¿scal action by Germany. In the model the real interest rate is unique since this was
not the case in Europe in the period under consideration, the German interest rate is probably
the best proxy for the whole area. Indeed, Table 4a shows that during ¿scal contractions the
German short-term rate decreased at ¿rst and then remained fairly constant, while the long
term rates remained fairly constant during and declined after the action.
Fiscal expansions were associated with more or less opposite results (Table 4b).
Consumption growth proved much lower than the EU average, both during and after the
expansion the current account, though continuously improving, remained in de¿cit the
differential in GDP growth was signi¿cantly negative during the action, but turned positive
afterwards the German short-term rate rose considerably during and declined slightly after,
while the long-term rate increased steadily. The only striking difference with respect to
contractions is the behavior of the real exchange rate: here, as predicted by the model, both
measures indicate a substantial real depreciation. Thus this picture of the path followed by
the main macroeconomic variables seems to be broadly in line with the predictions of the O-
R model. The only signi¿cant exceptions are GDP growth, which was positively rather than
negatively correlated with private consumption, and the real exchange rates, for which the
empirical evidence is more puzzling and no clear correlation with¿scalactions is discernible.
32
One of the most interesting results concerns private consumption and con¿rms the
¿ndings of Giavazzi and Pagano that in some EU countries consumers reacted to ¿scal policy
changes much more in line with “classical” than “Keynesian” predictions.
33 As is shown in
Section 2 consumption plays a crucial role in the international transmission of ¿scal impulses
to cast more light on this issue, the following equation was estimated on a panel of annual data
65 Froot and Rogoff (1991) provide evidence of a positive correlation between the real exchange rate and
domestic government consumption for the EU countries in 1979-1989. However, testing a small country neo-
classical model with traded and nontraded goods, they used real exchange rates based on consumer rather than
producer prices.
66 The countries are Ireland and Denmark (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990) and Sweden (Giavazzi and Pagano,
1996). In Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) cross-country evidence for all the OECD countries is also provided show-
ing that private consumption did respond to ¿scal policy changes according to the classical predictions when the
changes were strong and permanent.17
for the 10 EU countries considered in Table 3 and for the period 1979-1997:
34
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where  | and  W
| are the domestic and foreign rates of change in private consumption, and
 C| and  CW
| are the corresponding changes in public consumption (as a percentage of GDP, at
constant prices), _sso| is the differential between the domestic and foreign short-term real
interest rates, which were different from zero for most EU countries in the period considered
and therefore cannot be ignored in the empirical analysis as possible determinants of the
differentials in consumption growth, and >| is an uncorrelated error term. (6) is derived from
equation 41A in Appendix I according to the predictions of the O-R model the differential
in the rate of growth of private consumption between H and F is negatively affected by an
increase in domestic government expenditure (classical effect), but is positively affected by
a ¿scal expansion abroad (Keynesian effect), that is  	K f	fand K' K f .T h er e a l
interest rate differential has been included to control for the fact that, during the period, short
term real interest rates differred substantially across EU countries the expected sign of Sf is
obviously negative.
One advantage of estimating (6) is that it holds in both the short and long run, so that
data frequency is not relevant and annual data can be used. Another advantage is that the
signs, though not the absolute dimension, of Kf and K are independent of whether the ¿scal
shock is permanent or temporary (compare equations 41A and 54A in Appendix I). Since only
tradable goods are considered in the O-R model and it is assumed that there is no national
bias in government expenditure, the effects of domestic and foreign ¿scal actions are equal in
absolute size, but as public demand is likely to fall on non-traded goods as well, we should
expect mKmm K f m .
35 To check for the robustness of our results, we considered both the EU and
Germany as the “foreign country”.
67 For Italy, Swedenand Finland the sample periodis 1979-1992because, afterthat yearthesethree countries
adopted a Àexible exchange rate regime until October 1996 (Finland) and November 1996 (Italy).
68 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a, 1996) also develop a small-country model with traded and nontraded goods.
Following a permanent ¿scal expansion in H, the response of consumption is qualitatively the same as set forth
here, but there are differences in the behavior of the current account, which is not affected by the policy change,
and of the real exchange rate, which appreciates in the long run.18
Let us ¿rst consider the case in which the foreign country is EU
36 (Table 5a). We could
not reject the hypothesis that the two coef¿cients for domestic and foreign public consumption
have the same absolute value. Moreover, the signs are negative and positive, less than one, as
predicted by the model, and they are highly signi¿cant. This con¿rms that private consumption
r e a c t e dt od o m e s t i c¿ scal actions in a classical way also in a sample limited to the EU countries
and for a period shorter than that analyzed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996). Quite surprisingly,
spill-over effects were also relevant indeed, the a-priori presumption of national biais in public
consumption expenditure is not supported by the data. The coef¿c i e n to ft h es h o r t - t e r mr e a l
interest rate differential is negative, as expected, but is hardly signi¿cant. These results are
fairly robust since they do not depend on the estimating procedure. In particular, the ¿xed
effects model with autocorrelated disturbances indicates that an increase of 1 percentage points
in the rate of growth of domestic public consumption (relative to GDP) induces a fall of 0.4
percentage points in the rate of growth of domestic private consumption relative to the EU
average.
The same regression was also run considering Germany as the foreign country Table
5b shows the results. There are two main differences compared with those presented above.
First, the hypothesis that the absolute value of foreign public consumption is equal to that of
domestic public consumption could not be accepted indeed, it turns out that, while the size
of the former is about the same as estimated before, as it should be, the size of the latter
is signi¿cantly smaller. Second, the short term real interest rate differential turns out to be
negative and signi¿cant in this case this is not surprising since, until very recently, German
short term interest rates were lower than those prevailing in the other EU countries.
4. Conclusions
In the paper we present the “¿xed-exchange rate” version of the O-R model and show
how it can lead to a theoretical interpretation of ¿scal adjustments undertaken in the EU
countries in the last twenty years that differs in several respects from the standard Mundell-
Fleming approach.
69 Here EU is given by a weighted average of the 10 countries listed in Table 3.19
First, it is shown that, following an unanticipated cut in public consumption, the real
exchange rate of the country involved tends to appreciate rather than depreciate in the short
run. In contrast to the common wisdom, it follows that the fall in output is less pronounced
under ¿xed than Àexible exchange rates. A ¿xed exchange rate regime would thus not appear
to be such a bad thing if a number of countries all have to make signi¿cant budget cuts at once
in fact, the short-run depressive effect would be less than with Àexible exchange rates. This
result is diametrically opposed to that predicted by the Mundell-Fleming model.
Even more interestingly, monetary policy should become more expansionary, not
restrictive in the country undertaking a ¿scal consolidation. How can this be brought about?
If the responsibility for pegging the exchange rate is shared equally by the two countries,
the world money stock is simply redistributed from the foreign to the home country, so that
short-run money market equilibrium implies a higher real interest rate and a lower level of
consumption in both countries than those prevailing in the new steady state. On the contrary,
if the home country has the entire responsibility for pegging its exchange rate while the
foreign country pursues an independent monetary policy, the world money stock rises in the
short run, thus lowering the real interest rate and residents of both countries will enjoy more
consumption.
There are two rather appealing features in the model. First, all the results are general, in
the sense that they do not depend either on the relative size of the two countries involved, or
on the particular values of any parameter only the absolute size of the effects obviously does.
Second, the main predictions of the model are the same whether the ¿scal shock is permanent
or temporary. However, the comparative welfare gains from a monetary scheme of unilateral
pegging are much larger if the ¿scal consolidation in the home country is permanent.
A rigorous empirical test of the O-R model is beyond the scope of this paper and is
left to future research. Nevertheless, we show that the behavior of the main macroeconomic
variables following the major ¿scal shocks in the EU countries is broadly in line with the main
implications of the model. In particular, the results of panel regressions for 10 EU countries in
the period 1979-97 show that private consumption reacted to changes in public consumption
at home and abroad according to the predictions of the theoretical model. These ¿nding are
indeed consistent with previous results pointing to the relevance of classical effects of ¿scal
shock on private consumption behavior.Table 1
Long and Short Run Effects of a Permanent Cut 
in Public Consumption in H
World Country H Country F
Unilateral Bilateral Unilateral Bilateral Unilateral Bilateral
Long Run pegging pegging pegging pegging pegging pegging
Private Consumption + + –
Output – – +
Real Money Balances + + –
Money + •• + + – –
Prices •• – •• – •• –
Terms of Trade n.a. + –
Short Run World Country H Country F
Private Consumption + + + + – –
Output – – – – – –
Real Money Balances + •• + + •• –
Real Interest Rate – + – + – +
Current Account n.a. n.a. Surplus Surplus Deficit Deficit
Legenda: +  increase with respect to the initial steady-state equilibrium;
                                                           –  decrease;   ••  no change;  n.a. not applicable.Table 2
Long and Short Run Effects of a Temporary Cut 
in Public Consumption in H
World Country H Country F
Unilateral Bilateral Unilateral Bilateral Unilateral Bilateral
Long Run pegging pegging pegging pegging pegging pegging
··
Private Consumption •• + –
Output •• – +
Real Money Balances •• + –
Money •• •• + + – –
Terms of Trade n.a. + –
Short Run World Country H Country F
Private Consumption + •• + + – –
Output – – – – – –
Real Money Balances + •• + + – –
Real Interest Rate – •• – •• – ••
Current Account n.a. Surplus Surplus Deficit Deficit
Legenda: +  increase with respect to the initial steady-state equilibrium;
                                                           –  decrease;   ••  no change;  n.a. not applicable.Table 3
Episodes of severe expansion and contraction in




Denmark 1979-81 1983-86; 1989-91; 1994-95
Germany 1981-83; 1991-93 1989
France 1988-91;1994
Ireland 1980 1984; 1987-90;1993-97
Italy 1981-83 (1994-95)
Netherlands 1982 1984; 1988-90; 1994-97
Austria 1987-90; 1995-97
Finland 1990-92 (1993-95); 1997
Sweden 1990-93 1986-88; (1994-97)
Source: Based on Commission's data.
The episodes in brackets took place under a regime of flexible exchange
rates. For the definition of severe expansion (contraction) see note 27 in
the text.Table 4a
European Union : Macroeconomic effects
of fiscal contractions
(average rate of change)
Macroeconomic Previous  During Subsequent 
variable two years two years
GDP - EU (1) -0.1 0.8 0.2
(per capita)
Consumption - EU (1) -0.5 0.4 0.1
(per capita)
Current Account (2) -0.1 1.1 1.3
Current Account (2) 0.3 1.2 1.1
vis-à-vis EU
Real exchange rate 102.6 99.3 98.9
vis-à-vis EU
(ULC) (3)
Real exchange rate 103.3 102.0 101.2
vis-à-vis EU
(producer prices) (3)
Real interest rate 5.0 4.4 4.7
(short term)
Real interest rate 5.7 5.7 5.2
(long term)
German short term 3.7 3.2 3.3
real interest rate
German long term 4.4 4.6 4.1
real interest rate
Sources: Based on Commission's data and forecasts (May 1998).
(1) Weighted average of the 10 EU countries listed in Table 3.
(2) As a percentage of GDP.
(3) Levels. Index 1991=100. An increase indicates a real appreciation (an
     improvement in the terms of trade).Table 4b
European Union : Macroeconomic effects
of fiscal expansions
(average rate of change)
Macroeconomic Previous During Subsequent
variable two years  two years
GDP - EU (1) -0.3 -1.3 0.7
(per capita)
Consumption - EU (1) -0.4 -1.8 -0.6
(per capita)
Current Account (2) -2.3 -2.6 -1.1
Current Account (2) -0.5 -0.8 -0.4
vis-à-vis EU
Real exchange rate 99.8 99.5 94.8
vis-à-vis EU
(ULC) (3)
Real exchange rate 102.6 100.2 99.2
vis-à-vis EU
(producer prices) (3)
Real interest rate 2.5 4.0 3.7
(short term)
Real interest rate 3.0 4.3 5.3
(long term)
German short term 3.4 4.1 3.2
real interest rate
German long term 3.6 3.7 4.4
real interest rate
Sources: Based on Commission's data and forecasts (May 1998).
(1) For the definition of EU see note (1) to Table 4a.
(2) As a percentage of GDP.
(3) Levels. Index 1991=100. An increase indicates a real appreciation (an
     improvement in the terms of trade).Table 5a
Panel Regression Results of Equation:
F country is : European Union
OLS FE FE









nobs 175 175 165
Adj   R
2
0.26 0.29 0.20
Log L -343.2 -334.9 -311.9
F test 32.08 7.56 4.65
F test for the restriction 2.06 2.61 1.85
C C*  diffr
• • • •






b b 0 1 0 + =
$ rTable 5b
Panel Regression Results of Equation:
F country is : Germany
OLS FE FE









nobs 156 156 147
Adj   R
2
0.31 0.33 0.28
Log L -328.0 -321.8 -304.6
F test 24.47 7.95 6.13






C C*  diffr
• • • •
- = + + + a b G b G c 0 0 1 0 *
$ r
b b 0 1 0 + =Appendix I
The Obstfeld-Rogoff model with ¿xed exchange rates
The setup of the model is the same as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995a). The world is
inhabited by a continuum of consumer-producers, indexed by 5 5 dfco, each producing a
single differentiated good. The home country (H) consists of individuals in the interval dfc?o,
while the foreign country (F) consists of the remaining E?co.
Individuals’ preferences
37 are de¿nedover aconsumption index, , domesticrealmoney
balances * and effort , spent in production, with disutility . Output and effort are linked
by the following simple relationship, + ' ,*2, and the utility function for the representative

























; 5 dfc?o (1A)







E w 3 *w_5
w*Ew3
; 5 dfc?o (2A)
where w:is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. Since there are no impediments or
costs to trade, the law of one price holds for every good:
RE5'.R
WE5 ;5 5 dfco (3A)
where . is the nominal exchange rate (units of domestic currency for one unit of foreign
currency) and RE5 and RWE5 are the domestic and foreign currency prices of good 5.T h e













6: Since all individuals in the world share the same preferences, the maximization problem is presented here
with reference to the representative resident of H.30
Since home and foreign residents have the same preferences, (3A) and (4A) imply:
 ' .
W (5A)
so PPP holds also with respect to the composite consumption index. For the representative
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| are, respectively, the stock of international real riskless bonds and of
domestic money held at the end of period | o|is the real interest rate, expressed in terms
of the consumption index, earned between | and | n |are per capita lump-sum real taxes.









 ; 5dfc?oc ;55dfco (7A)
It is assumed that per capita government consumption, C, does not affect private utility.
Since Ricardian equivalence holds in the model, the government budget constraint can be
written as:








be a composite of goods as  and assume that governments are
price takers then integrating demand for good 5 across all H and F individuals and H and












|  ; 55dfco (9A)
where: `
|  ?| nE ?   W
| and C`
|  ?C| nE ?  C W
| are, respectively, the world per
capita private and public consumption.31
The representative individual in H maximizes (1A) subject to (6A), taking ` and C`




| and +|E are:
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where n | '
 | n
| E n o| and  is the nominal interest rate. Equilibrium for the world
economy requires that: a) domestic nominal money supply must be equal to demand in each
country b) net foreign assets must be zero
38 c) world total consumption (private and public)

















In order to analyze the effects of exogenous changes in C and CW a linearized version
has to be computed around a well-de¿ned initial equilibrium. First, de¿ne a steady-state
equilibrium as one in which all exogenous variables are constant. Since consumption is also
constant, from (10A) the world real interest rate is given by:
o 'E q  *q (14A)
where overbars indicate steady-state values. Steady-state consumption must equal steady-state
income in both countries
39:















A closed form solution exists for the fully symmetric steady state where 8f
W
' 8f '
f and Cf ' C
W
f 'f . Since prices are pre-set one period in advance, the model is
6; qIw .+ 4q , I
w @3 ; w=
6< The superscript m has been omitted to simplify notation.32
characterized by different short- and long-run equilibrium conditions, which have to be solved
simultaneously (let short-run be period 1 and long-run be period 2). The conditions that hold in
period 2 can be found by linearizing, around the initial symmetric steady state, the de¿nitions
of ` and C`, (4A) and (5A), together with equations (9A), (11A), (12A) and (13A) and
their foreign counterparts. With¿xed exchange rates, . is exogenous and constant at.,w h i l e
world per capita money stock, `  ? nE?W, becomes endogenous. Thus we end
up with the following system of 12 equations:
h 
` ' ?h  nE ? h 
W (17A)
h C
` ' ?h C nE ? h C
W (18A)
h  ' ?h REnE ? h R
WE s (19A)
h  ' h 
W (20A)
h + ' wE  ?Eh RE  h R
WEs n h 
` n h C
` (21A)
h +
W ' w?Eh RE  h R
WEs n h 
` n h C
` (22A)
E n wh + ' w h  n h 
` n h C
` (23A)
E n wh +
W ' w h 
W n h 
` n h C
` (24A)
h  ' o h 8 n h + nE ? Eh RE  h R





 o h 8 n h +
W  ? E h R E    h R
W E s   h C
W (26A)
i   h  ' h *0 (27A)
i 
W  h 
W ' h 
W*0 (28A)
where h f  _f*ff denote the percentage change in period 2 from the initial value, ff,f o r
any variable, except for h C  _C*
`
f , h CW  _CW*
`
f and h 8  _8*
`
f .I np e r i o d1 ,Ha n d



















By linearizing around the initial equilibrium (10A), (11A) and (12A), together with their
foreign counterparts, and with (29A) and (30A) and the de¿nitions of ` and C`,w eg e t33
the following system of 10 equations that fully characterize the short-run equilibrium of the
system:
e 
` ' ?e  nE ? e 
W (31A)
e C
` ' ?e C nE ? e C
W (32A)
e  ' h   E  qe o (33A)
e 
W ' h 
W  E  qe o (34A)
e + ' e 
` n e C
` (35A)
e +
W ' e 
` n e C
` (36A)
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W  e 



























where e f  _f*ff denotes the percentage change in period 1 from the initial value, ff,f o r
any variable, except e C  _C*
`
f , e CW  _CW*
`
f . e 8 ' h 8 s i n c ei np e r i o d2t h ec u r r e n t
account must be balanced.
Effects of a permanent worldwide ¿scal shock
First, we will consider the effects of a permanent world-wide ¿scal shock such that:
e C ' h C:f ,e C W'h C W:fand h C  h CW : f. To solve the model, ¿nd ¿rst h 8 from (31A)
- (38A) and then use it in (17A) - (28A) to compute the long-run solutions for all variables
long-run solutions can then be plugged back in (31A) - (40A) to ¿nd short-run solutions. The34
simplest approach is to solve for relative variables:
h   h 
W '
E n wE n o
[















h RE  h R
W Es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 E n o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E  ?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In the long run a permanent relative ¿scal expansion in H reduces that country’s relative
private consumption but increases relative output H’s terms of trade worsen and H runs a
current account de¿cit. To solve for the levels of individual variables, ¿rst compute the effects
on long-run world variables h `and h t `.Taking a weighted average of (21A) and (22A) and
of (23A) and (24A) and solving for h t ` and h `gives h t ` '
h C`




permanent increase in world public consumption raises the long-run level of world output, but
lowers private consumption by the same amount. The solutions for individual variables are
then given by:
h  ' 
h C`
2
 E  ?
E n wE n o
[

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E n o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(45A) is always negative and (47A) always positive but the sign of (46A) and (48A)
depends on the relative size of the ¿scal shock in F for h CWsuf¿ciently small Ee G h CW $ f
(46A) and (48A) are respectively positive and negative. From (27A) and (28A) it is also
possible to solve for the changes in real money balances, which depend only on the changes in
private consumption in H and F. Note that the long-run solutions for all real variables do not
depend on the way in which `is endogenized. However, to ¿nd the change in the absolute
73 In fact, @5 .u +4 . , A 3.
74 It is straightforward to show that i PZ  h S @ 
h JZ
5% .35
price level h  ' h  W,w en e e dt om a k es p e c i ¿ c assumptions about the way in which ` is set.
If F pursues an independent monetary policy aiming at long-run price stability

h  ' h W 'f





















Thus, a permanent world wide ¿scal expansion, by decreasing long-run private
consumption, implies lower world money stock. The money stock of H decreases, while the
effect on F’s money supply is ambiguous depending on the size of h CW.
To ¿nd the short run solutions it is ¿rst necessary to solve for the change in the real
interest rate e o. Since prices are ¿xed, F’s monetary policy is passive, that is f W 'f ,w h i l eH
sets its money stock to keep the exchange rate constant. In this case, the real interest rate is
determined entirely in F’s money market:
e o ' h 
W (52A)
e o:fif h CWis small compared with h C so that a relative ¿scal expansion in H leads to
an increase in the real interest rate. Given e o, it is straightforward to solve for the short-run
changes of H’s and F’s consumption, e  and e W,o fe  ` and, from (35A) and (36A) of their
output, e + and e +W. In the short run F’s real money balances are obviously constant, while the
endogenous change in those of H is:
f  '
E n wE n o
[0





Effects of a temporary worldwide ¿scal shock
In the case of a temporary ¿scal shock there are no effects on the long-run level of world
real variables (i.e.: h C` ' h t ` ' h ` 'f )a n dh C' h C W' h C ` 'f then solving for h   h W,36
h +  h +W, h RE  h RW Es and h 8 gives:



































The effects on relative long-run real variables are qualitatively the same as those induced
by a permanent ¿scal action. If e C e CW : f, H’s relative consumption will decline and H will
still run a de¿cit. The effects on individual variables are:
h  '
E n wE  ?o
[































Since a temporary shock has purely redistributive consequences, the effects in H and
F have opposite signs real money balances will change in line with private consumption
(equations 50A and 51A still hold). As before, in the short run the change in the real interest
rate is entirely determined in F’s money market (equation 52A still holds) and from (59A) will
always be positive for a relative ¿scal expansion by H.Appendix II
Welfare implications of alternative monetary policies
Following any shock at time , the change in utility for the representative H-country
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. An analogous expression can be obtained for
the representative resident of F. Following an unanticipated permanent cut in H’s public
consumption (h C	f ,h C W 'fand h C` ' ?h C), (1B) can now be evaluated under regime
J?e, in which H unilaterally pegs the exchange rate and F pursues an independent monetary
policy, and under regime |J in which H and F cooperate to peg the exchange rate. Since
the long-run changes are independent of the monetary regimes, we need only to evaluate the

































































































Subtracting (3B) from (2B) and (5B) from (4B) gives:















w h i c hi sa l w a y sp o s i t i v es i n c ee o J?e 	 f (equation 52A) , e o|J : f and h   h W : f for a
permanent ¿scal contraction by H.T h u st h ei m p r o v e m e n ti nw e l f a r ei st h es a m ef o rHa n d
F -country residents, if the ¿rst rather than the second monetary scheme is adopted.
It is straightforward to show that (6B) also holds for a temporary ¿scal contraction by H.
Since e oJ?e 	 f (equation 52A), e o|J 'f
43 and
h 3h W
0 : f, it follows that (6B) is still positive.
76 To see this, take a weighted average of (39A) and (40A) and solve for e u,g i v e nf P Z @3and no changes
in long-run values. Note that the real interest rate does not change for a temporary ¿scal shock with Àexible
exchange rates either (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995a).References
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